Were New Labour’s cultural policies neo-liberal? by Hesmondhalgh, David et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=gcul20
International Journal of Cultural Policy
ISSN: 1028-6632 (Print) 1477-2833 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gcul20
Were New Labour’s cultural policies neo-liberal?
David Hesmondhalgh, Melissa Nisbett, Kate Oakley & David Lee
To cite this article: David Hesmondhalgh, Melissa Nisbett, Kate Oakley & David Lee (2015) Were
New Labour’s cultural policies neo-liberal?, International Journal of Cultural Policy, 21:1, 97-114,
DOI: 10.1080/10286632.2013.879126
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/10286632.2013.879126
© 2014 The Author(s). Published by Taylor &
Francis
Published online: 23 Jan 2014.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 3555
View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 11 View citing articles 
Were New Labour’s cultural policies neo-liberal?
David Hesmondhalgha*, Melissa Nisbettb, Kate Oakleya and David Leea
aInstitute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK; bCulture,
Media and Creative Industries, King’s College London, London WC2R 2LS, UK
(Received 7 October 2013; accepted 23 December 2013)
This article assesses the cultural policies of ‘New Labour’, the UK Labour
government of 1997–2010. It takes neo-liberalism as its starting point, asking to
what extent Labour’s cultural policies can be validly and usefully characterised
as neo-liberal. It explores this issue across three dimensions: corporate sponsor-
ship and cuts in public subsidy; the running of public sector cultural institutions
as though they were private businesses; and a shift in prevailing rationales for
cultural policy, away from cultural justiﬁcations, and towards economic and
social goals. Neo-liberalism is shown to be a signiﬁcant but rather crude tool
for evaluating and explaining New Labour’s cultural policies. At worse, it fal-
sely implies that New Labour did not differ from Conservative approaches to
cultural policy, downplays the effect of sociocultural factors on policy-making,
and fails to differentiate varying periods and directions of policy. It does, how-
ever, usefully draw attention to the public policy environment in which Labour
operated, in particular the damaging effects of focusing, to an excessive degree,
on economic conceptions of the good in a way that does not recognise the
limitations of markets as a way of organising production, circulation and
consumption.
Keywords: cultural policy; neo-liberalism; instrumentalism; new public
management; Labour Party; New Labour
Any government of a major nation elicits considerable commentary. The Labour
government of the United Kingdom from 1997 to 2010 has probably inspired more
commentary than most. This was a long period of ofﬁce, based on three election
victories (1997, 2001 and 2005) and involving two charismatic leaders, Tony Blair
and Gordon Brown, who purportedly came to hate each other. Much of the com-
mentary was produced by journalists during the period that ‘New Labour’ was in
ofﬁce.1 Some was produced by academic researchers seeking to understand various
aspects of policy, such as education (Ball 2007) and health (Leys 2001). After the
Labour Party lost the 2010 UK General Election, the ﬂow of assessments somewhat
dried up. But the end of a government offers the opportunity to assess its achieve-
ments and failures in the round.
Although quite a lot has been written about particular aspects of New Labour’s
cultural policies (e.g. Belﬁore 2004, Stevenson et al. 2010, Newsinger 2012), there
has been little effort to assess them as a whole (though see Hewison 2011,
Newbigin 2011). This article is part of a broader project that aims to do so.2
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Labour’s cultural policies appear to be of some interest to scholars beyond the UK
(Cunningham 2007, Ross 2007, Prince 2010; see Stevenson et al. 2010). Here was
a government, with formidable power and resources, which placed great emphasis
on the importance of culture. It abolished charges for entry to national museums
and galleries, and visits to these institutions increased considerably. New museums,
galleries and other cultural facilities sprung up. Labour’s use of the ‘creative indus-
tries’ idea was widely seen as innovative and inﬂuential. UK cultural products
achieved some success, and although it is difﬁcult to be certain about how much
cultural policy was responsible for this, areas such as ﬁlm policy have been widely
credited for some of this success. Prime Minister Tony Blair once claimed that
Labour had enabled a ‘golden age’ for arts and culture in the UK.3 The post-2010
UK government, formed by a coalition of the right-wing Conservative Party and
the centrist Liberal Democrats, have introduced drastic cuts to arts funding (as well
as to welfare, local government, universities and other forms of public expenditure),
and some would say that this demonstrates the relative benignity of the preceding
Labour government. Yet few celebrated New Labour, or its cultural policies, while
they were in government, and few have mourned them since they lost power.
This article discusses New Labour’s cultural policies by focusing on whether
they might be validly interpreted as neo-liberal. Neo-liberalism is a characterisation
that has been made of New Labour’s policies in general (e.g. Jessop 2007, Wood
2010 among many others), not just their cultural policies. David Harvey’s deﬁnition
is widely quoted and cited: ‘a theory of political economic practices that proposes
that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong pri-
vate property rights, free markets, and free trade’ (Harvey 2005, p. 2). However, as
Harvey himself shows, practices of actual ‘neo-liberalization’ – the actions and pol-
icies of governments with a commitment to neo-liberal theory – vary considerably
(see also Ward and England 2007). Partly as a result of this variation, but also
because of misunderstanding and simpliﬁcation, the conceptual looseness of ‘neo-
liberalism’ is now widely recognised, even by those who use the term.
As a result, many are understandably tiring of it. For Susan Watkins, it is ‘a dis-
mal epithet … imprecise and over-used’ (Watkins 2010, p. 7). Hall (2011, p. 10)
writes that ‘the term lumps together too many things to merit a single identity; it is
reductive, sacriﬁcing attention to internal complexities and geohistorical speciﬁcity’.
Nevertheless, Watkins and Hall, like many others, can’t let go of it – and with good
reason. For Hall (2011, p. 10), ‘there are enough common features to warrant
giving it a provisional conceptual identity provided this is understood as a ﬁrst
approximation’. For Watkins (2010, p. 7), ‘some term is needed to describe the
macro-economic paradigm that has dominated from the end of the 1970s until – at
least – 2008’.
The concept of neo-liberalism is mainly used as a term of criticism from the
left. Very few people declare themselves to be neo-liberals. We do not depart
from the critical use of the concept. We believe that there are views and
practices that can usefully be deﬁned as ‘neo-liberal’, that these originated in
the mid-twentieth century and gained remarkable hegemony in government from
the 1970s onwards, and that policies based on such perspectives increased
inequality and restricted the freedoms of millions, while proclaiming to provide
greater liberty. But this article asks: is the term useful in understanding Labour’s
cultural policies? Our main aim, in answering that question, is primarily to
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explain and evaluate Labour’s policies, and neo-liberalism is mainly a starting
point for the analysis. We cannot explore in detail the origins of neo-liberal pol-
icies (see Peck 2010, Foucault 2010) or the complex ways in which neo-liberal-
ism relates to the development of the modern state (see Jessop 2008). A second
key aim is to provide some theoretical reﬁnement of the ways in which cultural
policies are critically analysed.
The most developed discussions of cultural policy in relation to neo-liberal-
ism have been provided by McGuigan (2004, 2005, 2010).4 In a piece in this
journal, McGuigan (2005) wrote of how an all-pervasive ‘market-oriented
mentality’ (229) in modern societies had put into question the role of cultural
policy in providing a ‘modest counterweight’ to commercial culture (235).
McGuigan polemically claimed that everyday life (not just politics and policy)
had become permeated by notions of the good derived from business.
McGuigan was perhaps too bold in declaring ‘neoliberal globalisation’ the best
way to ‘characterise and name’ the entire condition of the modern world (229).
Historical conjunctures can hardly be characterised in two words, even as short-
hand. This is to risk committing an error to which McGuigan himself alluded
by quoting the political theorist Andrew Gamble, that of treating neo-liberalism
as ‘a phenomenon which manifests itself everywhere and in everything’
(Gamble 2001, p. 134) and ‘as though it is the source of everything else, from
new Labour to global poverty’. And, with particular relevance for this article,
Gamble goes on to give an example: ‘European social democracy … has
plainly been inﬂuenced by neo-liberal ideas, but to suggest that it has become
simply an expression of neo-liberalism, is too simple a judgement. Other factors
are at work’ (though see Mudge 2008, who plausibly argues that centre-left
governments have been more effective than conservative ones in gaining accep-
tance for neo-liberalisation measures). It is better, wrote Gamble, ‘to deconstruct
neo-liberalism into the different doctrines and ideas which compose it, and
relate them to particular practices and political projects’ (134). That is what we
seek to do.
However, McGuigan helpfully identiﬁed ways in which contemporary
cultural policy might be characterised as neo-liberal:
 the increasing corporate sponsorship of culture that might previously have
been funded by public subsidy,
 an increasing emphasis on running public sector cultural institutions as
though they were private businesses,
 a shift in the prevailing rationale for cultural policy, away from culture, and
towards economic and social goals: ‘competitiveness and regeneration’ (238)
and ‘an implausible palliative to exclusion and poverty’ (238).
We structure our discussion of New Labour’s cultural policies roughly accord-
ing to these three categories, asking to what extent those policies can validly and
usefully be characterised as neo-liberal. For reasons of space, we discuss corporate
sponsorship only brieﬂy, instead focusing on whether New Labour showed a genu-
ine commitment to public subsidy of culture and the arts. McGuigan’s categorisa-
tion by no means provides a comprehensive assessment of the relations between
cultural policy, the state, neo-liberalism and New Labour. But it draws attention to
some key issues that are worth exploring in greater depth.
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Privatisation of culture?
The increasing use of private sponsorship to support the arts has undoubtedly been
one of the major developments in UK cultural policy over the last 30 or 40 years. A
key organisation involved in arts sponsorship claims that business sponsorship of the
arts has increased since 1976 from £600,000 per year to £686 million per year in
2009 (Arts and Business’s website: http://artsandbusiness.bitc.org.uk). This suggests
a remarkable growth. Wu (2002, p. 47–82) argued that the increasing presence of cor-
porate intervention in the arts, including sponsorship, was intimately connected to
attempts by the Reagan and Thatcher governments to reduce the public sector and
radically expand the power of big business – to what many would call neo-liberalism,
or neo-liberalisation.
If increasing arts sponsorship and corporate intervention have been long-term
trends in cultural policy across much of the world, to what extent can New Labour
be seen as actively promoting or at least failing to inhibit them? New Labour’s
pro-business orientation was quite in keeping with the move on the part of arts and
cultural organisations towards greater ‘partnerships’ with the private sector. But
what about government expenditure? A truly ‘privatising’ cultural policy would
presumably seek strongly to substitute such private income for public spending.
But Labour politicians claim that they considerably increased funding for the arts
and culture. Former Minister for Culture and Tourism Margaret Hodge reckoned in
2010 that investment in the arts had gone up by 83% in real terms since 1997
(Hodge 2010). Labour’s so-called ‘cultural manifesto’ (one of a number of docu-
ments that have been called Creative Britain over the years) prepared for the 2010
General Election, cited a real-terms expenditure increase of 90%. It is not clear
how either of these percentages were arrived at.
How accurate are these ﬁgures? Changes in accounting procedures make com-
parisons using DCMS data very difﬁcult, but Arts Council of England funding pro-
vides at least one measure, and this increased from 186.6 million in 1998–1999 to
452.9 million in 2009–2010 (see Table 1 below). This represents a real increase of
something like 35%, assuming the Bank of England’s average inﬂation rate of
Table 1. Government grant-in-aid to Arts Council England.
Year Funding (£ million)
1997–1998 186.60
1998–1999 189.95
1999–2000 228.25
2000–2001 237.155
2001–2002 251.455
2002–2003 289.405
2003–2004 324.955
2004–2005 368.859
2005–2006 408.678
2006–2007 426.531
2007–2008 423.601
2008–2009 437.631
2009–2010 452.964
2010–2011 438.523
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2.7% per year between 1999 and 2010. That is a very signiﬁcant increase, even in
an era of relative economic prosperity.5
On top of that increase were considerable extra cultural subsidies from three
further sources. One was the BBC, a vital form of cultural funding in the UK,
although it falls outside our study of cultural policy.6 Lunt and Livingstone (2012,
p. 116) cite a 63% increase in BBC funding between 1997 and 2010, which would
equate to about 14% in real terms. The second was local government spending on
arts and culture, funded from a mixture of central government grants and local rev-
enue sources, such as Council Tax and local government charges.7 It is very difﬁ-
cult to ﬁnd composite ﬁgures regarding local government expenditure on arts,
culture and heritage. But Labour increased central government grants to local gov-
ernment from £82 billion in 1999 to £173 billion in 2010 (UK Public Spending
website 2013), and considerable sums were available from EU Structural Funds.
This enabled local government to invest, particularly in ‘cultural infrastructure’.
However, local government grants were often subject to rigid prescriptions regard-
ing the Private Finance Initiative.
Lottery funding and its problems
The other source of extra funding was lottery revenue, and this is vital to under-
standing Labour’s funding of arts and culture. The National Lottery was introduced
by the Conservative government of John Major and launched in 1994. Over the
ﬁrst two franchises, covering 1994–2007, 28% of revenues were provided to what
are called the ‘Good Causes’. The make-up of these Good Causes has changed in
complicated ways since the 1990s. A major development was that the 1998 Lottery
Act allowed funds to be spent on health, education and the environment. From
2005, 50% of Good Cause Lottery money went to the Big Lottery Fund, combining
health, education and environment with funding for the voluntary and community
sectors. The remaining 50% was divided equally between arts, heritage and sport.
As a result, between 1997 and 2010, some £3 billion of Lottery funds were distrib-
uted to the arts and heritage. It should be emphasised that these resources were in
addition to increases in the Arts Council, local arts and culture, and broadcasting
budgets. This would hardly seem to ﬁt with any reasonable depiction of Labour’s
cultural policies as ‘neo-liberal’, if neo-liberalism is understood to involve cuts in
public spending, as it very often is.
However, there are some signiﬁcant downsides to lottery funding – including of
the arts and culture. A ﬁrst is that, when it is considered as a form of ‘implicit tax-
ation’, there is signiﬁcant evidence that lottery funding tends to be regressive in
social distribution (Clotfelter and Cook 1989, p. 221–230). Lower-income groups
spend a much higher proportion of their income on lottery tickets (Clotfelter and
Cook 1989, p. 229; see also Clotfelter 2000). When used to fund the arts and cul-
ture, there is a danger that the regressive element becomes worse, given that lot-
teries often seem to be used to fund activities undertaken and products consumed
primarily by higher socio-economic groups (this argument is made polemically by
Wisman 2006; see also Pickernell et al. 2004). A second objection to lotteries is
that they prey on people’s misunderstandings of their chances of winning, which
are extremely small (see Beckert and Lutter 2009). A third factor is that
policy-makers inevitably must come to see lottery as a potential substitution for
other (usually more progressive) forms of taxation – although this is impossible to
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prove, it seems unfeasible that policy-makers would somehow eradicate the
knowledge of lottery funding from their mind in considering other funding. This
combination of factors may not mean arguing against lotteries altogether, and it
cannot be used to support an argument that New Labour’s cultural policies were
covertly neo-liberal. But it does suggest that praise for increased funding for arts
and culture, where that funding derives signiﬁcantly from lottery sources, needs to
be qualiﬁed.
In discussions of Labour’s record, big Lottery-funded projects loom large. Even
critical commentators point to the success of various prestige projects, many of
them funded in part by the Lottery, and some of them in fact initiated under the
previous Conservative administration of John Major. London’s Tate Modern is
nearly always mentioned.8 The British Museum’s Great Court, funded by £46 mil-
lion of lottery money and considerable corporate sponsorship, is often deemed a
great success (Millard 2010). Projects involving the Lowry in Salford, Ikon Gallery
in Birmingham and the Sage/Baltic complex in Tyneside (Newcastle-Gateshead) are
frequently praised by those metropolitan commentators who show any concern for
life outside the capital (e.g. Frayling 2005, Toynbee 2011). Labour politicians and
defenders point to the large numbers of visitors at some sites and the popularity of
some attractions with local visitors. Academic researchers have been much more
wary about such projects, but in some cases have recognised how more successful
projects might enhance (some) residents’ perceptions of their own city or town
(such as Miles 2005 on the Sage/Baltic complex).
However, critics, especially those in the media, claim that much of the money –
especially the windfall of National Lottery funding – was spent on extremely
expensive and in some cases unsustainable prestige building projects. The most
notorious instance of these ﬂagship projects was the Millennium Dome in Green-
wich, London (see McGuigan and Gilmore 2002, Gray 2003) though its long-term
fate has been more successful. There were numerous other failures that were not
redeemed: Shefﬁeld’s National Centre for Popular Music (which closed in 2000,
and cost £11 million of lottery money); the National Centre for Visual Arts in Car-
diff (closed in 2000, £3 million of lottery money); and Life Force, a museum in
Bradford about the history of religious belief (£2.2 million lottery grant, closed in
2001). The House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts reported in 1999 on
projects funded through Arts Council England’s lottery-funded capital programme,
focusing on 15 of the 28 projects that had secured more than £5 million of money
in the capital round of 1995–2000, and expressed serious concerns about their man-
agement (House of Commons 1999). A follow-up report found that of the 13 such
projects by then completed, four were more than a year behind schedule, and 13 of
the 15 were over budget, by between 1.7 and 58% (National Audit Ofﬁce 2003).
These had been projects initiated under the previous Conservative government, and
the Arts Council claimed to be learning from earlier mistakes, but there continued
to be problematic or failed projects. The Public, in West Bromwich (West Mid-
lands), was a later example, absorbing around £31.8 million of Arts Council
money, plus around £25 million more of local government grants. This facility,
which combined art, retail and leisure facilities, opened in 2008, many years behind
schedule. Although at the time of writing, it is now receiving considerable visitor
numbers (380,000 in 2012), The Public remains under threat, and much of it seems
likely to be turned into a college (see Blackstock 2011 for an assessment of what
went wrong). Tottenham’s Bernie Grant Arts Centre and Deptford’s Stephen
102 D. Hesmondhalgh et al.
Lawrence Centre (both in London) have also been lambasted, among others by
Millard (2010). Some of the criticisms seem heavily imbued by a metropolitan
snobbery that portrays any difﬁculties in luring substantial crowds as a sign of
outright failure and waste (such as Millard’s comments on Walsall’s New Art
Gallery and the Baltic). Nevertheless, some of the problems surrounding the major
ﬂagship projects built in the 2000s should be a serious concern for supporters of
public subsidy of the arts and culture. Support for public subsidy should not entail
a complacent attitude towards proﬂigacy. A major cause of overspend, especially in
the early days of New Labour, seems to have been optimistic, sometimes even
absurd, projections of visitor numbers.9 How much Labour can be blamed for such
problems is a difﬁcult question. The UK media were not slow to attack Labour for
these failures and problems, even though it inherited many of them from the
previous regime (including the Dome). However, the failure to abandon the most
misguided projects suggests that cultural policy under Labour failed to exercise
proper scepticism about these top-down initiatives.
The considerable expenditure involved seems to refute the suggestion that
Labour’s cultural policies were neo-liberal. There is a connection to neo-liberalisa-
tion nevertheless. These projects were nearly all justiﬁed on the grounds of urban
regeneration, a concept that spread across the developed world during the era of
neo-liberalism like knotweed in a garden. Some urban regeneration schemes have,
according to their critics, appropriated art and culture for the purposes of economic
development, as a means of addressing post-industrial decline in western cities.
Although dependent on huge amounts of public subsidy, such projects were often –
though not always – based on top-down partnership arrangements. In the British
case, ﬂagship urban regeneration projects were often linked to the idea that the cre-
ative industries were a growing and dynamic part of modern economies – an idea
which, as is well known, the UK Labour government were extremely active in pro-
moting.10 Internationally, such ﬂagship projects have been condemned as ‘isolated
and exclusive spaces that are designed to serve visitors over residents and that are
divorced from any public planning process’ (Grodach 2010, p. 354). A case study
approach to such ﬂagship projects shows that there are many variations among
them, and some are much more effective than others in achieving a meaningful
revitalisation of cities (Grodach’s study of three Californian cases demonstrates
this). The best projects take into account local lived experience and histories,
including the nature of local cultural and artistic production. Even in such cases,
however, the exclusions and displacements of gentriﬁcation are never far away.
What is the alternative? Evans (2009, p. 22) contrasts such ‘new-build cultural
facilities’ and other ﬂagship projects – whether relatively successful, failed or strug-
gling – with the more ‘organic’ and ‘community-oriented’ arts centres that, in his
view, thrived in an earlier generation. Yet a critique of gentriﬁcation should not
lead to a dismissal of any and all attempts to construct new ‘ofﬁcial’ art spaces.
Nor should a previous generation’s practices be romanticised.
‘Neo-liberal’ is too simplistic a term to describe Labour’s role in these complex
developments. Their boost to public expenditure on art and culture, however prob-
lematic its sources in a Lottery system developed by the previous Conservative
administration, helped stave off privatisation of a kind explicitly advocated by the
Coalition government that followed them. Nevertheless, New Labour did very little
to resist the international tendency towards top-down regeneration, some of which
was ill-conceived and mismanaged, at least in the early years of Labour.
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We might also ask: how much credit should we give to Labour for their
increased spending on arts and culture? Labour was the beneﬁciary of the windfall
of an unprecedented economic bubble in the UK. Economic growth in the UK
boomed from 1995 to 2006, and this allowed the second Labour administration to
allow marked increases in public expenditure, because of rising taxes. Yet by 2009,
it had become apparent that economic growth had been the product of an inﬂated
property market, and an outsized ﬁnancial sector that was reaping the rewards of
unregulated markets. When the bubble burst, funding cuts hit very quickly.11
Audit and new public management
Although their record shows a commitment to considerable public expenditure on
arts and culture, New Labour were also keen to show themselves to be friendly
towards business. They actively embraced choice, competition and efﬁciency as
key elements of a better society. Here, then, the ‘neo-liberal’ idea potentially has
greater purchase than in considering Labour’s public expenditure – though one does
not have to be a neo-liberal to see some virtue in these goals, and it would be
absurd to portray social-democratic parties (of the ‘Old Labour’ kind) as inherently
hostile towards them. Nevertheless, in its adoption of ‘Third Way’ policies, and its
alignment with the US Democratic Party rather than European social-democratic
governments, Labour signiﬁcantly distanced itself from social-democratic views of
the way in which the pursuit of proﬁt by businesses might damage the well-being
of workers and citizens. New Labour adopted a longstanding conservative suspicion
of the public sector, and the often dubious Conservative view of the private sector
as more efﬁcient and effective than the public sector was undoubtedly given a
major boost by the international rise of neo-liberalism. It is reasonable to say that,
in a number of its policies, New Labour successfully completed the implementation
of neo-liberalising policies that the Conservatives had struggled to realise – notably
the Private Finance Initiative and the shifting of delivery away from local control
(see Wilks-Heeg 2009).
One important way in which New Labour’s suspicions of the public realm were
manifested, across Labour’s policies in general, including its cultural policies, was
its adoption of ‘new public management’ mechanisms, especially top-down perfor-
mance management tools. Two inﬂuential articles by Christopher Hood (1991,
1995) crystallised the term new public management (NPM) to describe a series of
developments in public administration in the 1980s, especially in the UK. The main
characteristics Hood identiﬁed are summarised by Lapsley (2009, p. 3) as follows:
(1) Unbundling public sector into corporatised units organised by product.
(2) More contract-based competitive provision, with internal markets and term
contracts.
(3) Stress on private sector management styles.
(4) More stress on discipline and frugality in resource use.
(5) Visible hands-on top management.
(6) Explicit formal measurable standards and measurement of performance and
success.
(7) Greater emphasis on output controls.
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Intended to achieve accountability and transparency, these techniques ultimately
involved a lack of trust in public service workers and managers, who were under-
stood as working subjects in need of constant vigilance and monitoring. New
Labour adopted these techniques with new vigour. All government departments
under Labour were required to adhere to Public Service Agreements (PSAs), with
lists of objectives which were known as Delivery Service Objectives (DSOs),
addressing slippery targets such as ‘excellence’ and ‘economic impact’. As one
document produced by the Department of Culture, Media and Sport helpfully
explained:
In October 2007, 30 new PSAs were announced as part of the Comprehensive Spend-
ing Review 2007 and set out the priority outcomes for the CSR2007 period, 2008–09
to 2010–11 … Each department also agreed with HM Treasury a set of DSOs, which
are designed to complement and sometimes underpin related PSAs. DCMS leads on
one PSA (PSA22), and has four DSOs. (DCMS, n.d.)
Governments have to provide some language for what they propose to do, and
whether they have done it, and this is rarely attractive. But the discourse of perfor-
mance management evident here surely reﬂects a deeply impoverished notion of
public service, indeed of life itself. This was particularly evident in local govern-
ment. The Labour government’s scheme for bringing about the ‘modernisation’ of
local government, which they called Best Value, was introduced in the Local
Government Act of 1999. Local government analyst Gerry Stoker reported in 2004
that there was a ‘widespread sense that the processes associated with Best Value
have presented a major challenge but that they have largely been adopted, and led to
small-scale incremental improvements in services in a wide range of cases’ (Stoker
2004, p. 94). The price paid, however, was time-consuming and expensive perfor-
mance management. Best Value, among other elements, required local councils to
undertake a quinquennial performance review, according to the degree to which they
achieved the three ‘E’s of economy, efﬁciency and effectiveness, assessed via the
four ‘C’s criteria, of challenge, comparison, consultation and competitiveness.
In an early discussion of the implications of such national and local techniques
for cultural policy, Belﬁore (2004) drew on critical studies of the ‘audit society’
(Power 1997) to argue that they represented an intensiﬁed form of top-down control
that made arts and cultural policy vulnerable to changes in political direction. More
broadly, as Belﬁore pointed out, drawing on critical analysts such as John Clarke
and Alan Finlayson, such techniques attempt to remove political discussion and
debate from the process of government, or at least to diminish its role. They also
represent an attack on the public domain. As Marquand (2004) argued, New
Labour evinced a populist scorn for intermediate institutions and professionalism –
which, like Conservatives, Labour tended to see in terms of the protection of vested
interests. In crime, education and migration policy, the Labour leadership was often
antagonistic towards the social liberalism and/or libertarianism at large amongst
professionals working in these sectors, and the same was true in cultural policy
(see Hesmondhalgh 2005).
In fact, as Bowerman et al. (2000) usefully point out, the term ‘audit society’ is
useful but insufﬁcient. They offer instead the idea of a ‘performance management
society’ to describe the permeation of such techniques throughout most modern or-
ganisations. Performance management includes not just audit itself, but also
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techniques of inspection, benchmarking, self-assessment, strategic planning, target
setting, key performance indicators and service agreements. Researchers of public
administration, such as Lapsley (2009), have discussed how NPM techniques
constantly disappoint policy-makers, because of their reliance on (often ineffective)
management consultants, unrealistic expectations of the contribution of IT systems,
the creation of tick box cultures of compliance and the stiﬂing of innovation
through stultifying forms of so-called ‘risk management’. This, we should add, is
not from a radical critic of management, but a ﬁgure committed to making public
administration more effective (see also James 2004).
NPM-style instruments of policy were deeply disliked within the arts and heri-
tage communities, in a way that directly parallels the resentments of teachers, medi-
cal professionals and university academics towards similar infringements on
autonomy in other institutions. From the early 2000s onwards, senior arts ﬁgures
began to make public statements protesting against audit. An article in The Obser-
ver by incoming National Theatre Director Nicholas Hytner in 2003 praised
increased arts expenditure by Labour, but castigated monitoring of audiences aimed
at ensuring the broadening of access (Hytner 2003). As we shall see, this relates to
other debates about ‘instrumentalism’ in cultural policy, but the issue here is also
one of top-down control, and the potential shortening of the ‘arm’s length’ principle
at the heart of UK arts policy (see also Frayling 2005). As John Holden put it in a
publication for the Labour-linked think tank Demos:
A growing sense of unease pervades the cultural sector as it sets about justifying its
consumption of public money. Instead of talking about what they do – displaying pic-
tures or putting on dance performances – organisations will need to demonstrate how
they have contributed to wider policy agendas such as social inclusion, crime preven-
tion and learning … Even where targets refer to cultural activities, they are often
expressed in terms of efﬁciency, cost-per-user and audience diversity, rather than dis-
cussed in terms of cultural achievement. (Holden 2004, p. 13–14)
The problem, Holden noted, was ‘particularly acute in the relationship between
local authorities and the cultural organisations that they fund’. In 2004, Clive Gray
discussed the pressures on local arts administrators arising from such techniques
and from New Labour local government reforms. Local, sub-national cultural strate-
gies, reported Gray, needed to take into account:
at least ﬁve different central government departments, four separate task forces, and
ten ‘arm’s-length’ ‘sponsored agencies’, as well as at least ten statutory plans and ﬁve
nonstatutory ones, alongside the local authority’s own corporate strategy, Best Value
plan, [and] individual service strategies and plans, and more or less anything else up
to and including the planning kitchen sink. (Gray 2004, p. 39–40)
The third Minister of Culture in the 1997–2010 period, James Purnell, made some
efforts to distance himself from such proliferation of NPM techniques when, in a
2007 speech he signalled a shift in cultural policy away from ‘targetolatry’, a
fetishism of targets. Purnell’s response, however, was based on a return to ‘excel-
lence’ as a basis for funding the arts, which was very much what the powerful UK
arts establishment wanted to hear. He commissioned a report from the former direc-
tor of the prestigious Edinburgh International Festival, Brian McMaster, which was
delivered in 2008. This was more a piece of advocacy than a set of practical sug-
gestions. Among the few concrete recommendations contained in the report were
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that 10 organisations ‘with the most innovative ambition’ (which, like ‘excellence’
itself, the report struggled to deﬁne) should be provided with 10-year funding, that
there should be more touring, and that Boards should contain at least two artists.
However, the effect on DCMS operations seems to have been minimal, perhaps
because Purnell resigned in 2009. Purnell’s attack on ‘targetolatry’ is discussed by
Eleonora Belﬁore as an example of what Brandenberg calls ‘political bullshit’, in
the sense of the term developed by philosopher Harry Frankfurt: ‘a proactive strate-
gic communication, meant not to hide a truth or reality or to divert from a particu-
lar responsibility, but to create or manage an impression’ (Belﬁore 2009, p. 351).
The intensiﬁed use of audit and NPM techniques are aspects of Labour cultural
policy which were both ineffective and damaging to arts and cultural practice in
the UK. But were they neo-liberal? Few of the people involved in such practices
would subscribe to the principles of neo-liberalism in the way it is usually deﬁned
– the view that the role of the state should be limited to safeguarding individual
and commercial liberty and private property rights. Indeed, the massive and intru-
sive role of government agencies involved in NPM techniques seems at odds with
such principles in many ways. Yet NPM undoubtedly derives from the deep suspi-
cion of the public domain and of public sector workers that helped fuel the success
of neo-liberalism. The acceptance of such ‘neo-liberalesque’ views by politicians,
policy-makers and the media put public services on the defensive, and New Labour
were far too willing to adopt dubious forms of public management, rather than to
defend public services and the public domain.
What’s more, as we shall now consider, New Labour public policy involved
conceptions of the good derived from certain understandings of economics as a
discipline, and of economic life, which were profoundly inﬂuenced by the rise of
neo-liberalism. This takes us to the third of McGuigan’s categorisations of how
neo-liberalism related to cultural policy in the twenty-ﬁrst century – a shift in the
prevailing rationale for cultural policy, away from culture and towards economic
and social goals.
Instrumentalism, economic and social
During the second term of New Labour’s period in ofﬁce, the term ‘instrumental-
ism’ came to be employed widely. It referred to the idea that culture was being
used too much as an instrument to achieve non-cultural ends such as economic and
social outcomes. Academics had started to point out that evaluating policy in terms
of economic and social outcomes was a serious mistake given the highly problem-
atic nature of the data that were available, and that were likely to be available
given the difﬁculties of establishing causality in such complex circumstances
(Belﬁore 2002). In 2003, the issue of ‘cultural value’ was explored at a seminar
hosted by the inﬂuential Labour think tank, Demos. The seminar was attended by
the then UK Minister of Culture, Tessa Jowell, who responded by writing a highly
unusual personal reﬂection on cultural value. Predictably this was greeted in many
policy and media quarters as unacceptably wishy-washy, because it supposedly
failed to make hard choices between cultural spending and other needs such as
prison ofﬁcers (see the response by think tank IPPR cited by Holden 2004). While
it is to Jowell’s credit that she made an effort to engage with ‘intrinsic’ cultural
value, her essay, as Yoon (2010) has pointed out, mixes rather vague invocations of
such value with a different set of instrumentalist rationales, involving ‘aspiration’.
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John Holden, writing for Demos, went further than Jowell in trying to outline a
conception of ‘intrinsic value’ that drew on anthropological and other thought,
while maintaining the need for accountability.12 Yet a new set of rationales based
on ‘intrinsic’ cultural value have proven highly elusive. This is not to say that the
search for such rationales is not worth pursuing – though it is not one we can
undertake in this article.
The debates about ‘cultural value’ can be seen as policy-makers’ attempts to
recognise the deep limitations of existing frameworks exerted by neo-liberalism,
but in truth the debates affected cultural policy very little indeed, if at all. For New
Labour’s overriding thrust was to embody both economic and social goals in all
forms of policy. In the speciﬁc realm that we are considering, they were building
on long-term changes that had been driving cultural policy in the direction of eco-
nomic and social goals for many decades. The move to conﬁgure cultural policy in
economic terms had begun in earnest in the 1970s, and the neo-liberal tide
undoubtedly moved cultural policies further in that direction over the decades that
followed. Linked to this was a strong liberal view that markets represented the best,
if not the only, source of legitimate information regarding people’s well-being (see
O’Neill 1998).
However, the concept of neo-liberalism only partly explains this shift towards
instrumentalism. It especially excludes how sociocultural changes affected the pol-
icy environment. From the 1940s to the 1970s, the forms of cultural production
and exhibition that had received most subsidies were those which were felt to be
historically and even spiritually signiﬁcant, and a key part of national or even glo-
bal heritage – classical music, theatre and opera, the great galleries and museums,
and important buildings and monuments. Justiﬁcations for such subsidy drew on
accounts of that historical and spiritual signiﬁcance, derived from a mixture of
sources. Also included were modernist forms of production which were presented
as the latest (though highly problematic and controversial) phase in a history of civ-
ilisation and creativity. Both ‘classical’ and modernist arts were set against a
debased, contemporary, commercial, mass culture. But this system began to break
down in the 1960s and 1970s, as new generations of writers critiqued the elitism
and snobbery involved in such cultural hierarchies. The erosion of the legitimacy
and authority of high culture also affected the modernist avant-garde, which in any
case was approaching intellectual exhaustion (which in turn fed back into the
attack, in the form of new, ‘postmodern’ forms of high art that celebrated popular
culture, such as Warhol). All this meant that, when governments, following neo-lib-
eral precepts, responded to the Long Downturn of the 1970s and 1980s by tighten-
ing public expenditure, arts and cultural organisations found it increasingly difﬁcult
to justify subsidy on the traditional grounds of spiritual enlightenment, maintaining
the canon of elevating great works and so on. In truth, there was never an era when
such justiﬁcations were easy – and serious government support for the arts only
really began in the UK in the 1960s, under the Labour government of the time.
But in the 1980s, seeing that governments were adopting economically driven ways
of thinking, arts and cultural organisations and their allies increasingly turned to
various economic justiﬁcations. These included the concept of ‘market failure’ (see
Freedman 2008) – the idea that government subsidy was needed to ﬁll gaps where
markets could not adequately provide ‘merit goods’. They also included a newer
argument, concerning the contribution of cultural goods to generating money for
national, regional and local economies through tourism and other means.
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Meanwhile, smaller, more grassroots organisations turned to a different set of new
legitimations, in keeping with their left-wing commitments, and those of leftist local
government: that they could make social contributions, for example, by teaching
prisoners how to write or by encouraging artistic participation on the part of young
people who might otherwise commit crime. Similar developments took place across
Europe and in different ways across the developed world, though of course there
were signiﬁcant national variations. The use of cultural policy to achieve social
goals – as ‘an implausible palliative’ in McGuigan’s phrase – is hardly neo-liberal in
any coherent sense of that term. But it points to the increasing problems faced in
legitimising cultural spending, a problem made much worse by neo-liberalism.
Simplistic uses of the term neo-liberalism have another major drawback: they
fail to differentiate between different phases and types of public policy. Some
recent contributions to public policy studies argue that it is important to take
account of different varieties and periods of neo-liberalism, including the idea that,
in some states, following an initial period of hard neo-liberalism, governments
sought to repair the social damage caused by earlier policies (cf. the notion of ‘roll-
back’ and ‘roll-out’ versions of neo-liberalism, see Peck 2010). According to this
view, in the 1990s, national and local governments have increasingly taken on the
role of enabling market actors, while seeking to ensure some social amelioration,
and to provide a check on the most damaging outcomes of market forms of gover-
nance (Craig and Cotterell 2007). Applying this to cultural policy (as Scott and
Craig 2012 do) would mean recognising that cultural policy-makers push not only
in the direction of economic beneﬁts, but also pursue social beneﬁts through policy.
In the case of New Labour, this can be observed in initiatives such as Creative
Partnerships (which we discuss elsewhere) which sought to make links between
education policy and cultural policy (see, e.g. Hall and Thomson 2007, Jones and
Thomson 2008).
Conclusions
A key implication when New Labour policies are characterised as ‘neo-liberal’ is
that they showed very strong continuity with the preceding Conservative govern-
ments, including the hard right neo-liberalism of the Thatcher administrations
(1979–90). But there are ways in which Labour has, throughout the history of its
post-war cultural policies, both at the national and the regional level, responded
somewhat differently than the Conservatives to fundamental dilemmas of cultural
policy (Bianchini 2014), and the New Labour period of government continued this
trend. In post-war cultural policy, the most basic tension was between ‘raising’ and
‘spreading’, or excellence and access. Should money be spent on big, prestigious,
expensive, usually metropolitan culture, so that the nation could offer cultural pro-
ductions that could compete with ‘the best’ internationally (raising); or should it be
spent on ‘spreading’ culture across the country and the regions, supporting smaller
institutions, and encouraging grassroots participation? New Labour politicians
tended to deny that contradictions between excellence and access existed. What
they really meant was that they were committed to both the big international insti-
tutions and to more grassroots and participatory cultural activities. In order to make
good on this double commitment, Labour had to ﬁnd more money for culture,
which, as we have seen, they actually did, though much of it came from the
problematic source of the Lottery, a Conservative innovation. All this, we have
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argued, complicates an assessment of New Labour as neo-liberal tout court. How-
ever, the price to be paid for this commitment to art and culture was that Labour
enthusiastically embraced the general international trend towards NPM techniques,
highly inﬂuenced by neo-liberal distrust of the public sector and the public realm.
It also drew on economistic notions of the goals of cultural policy. The inﬂuence of
neo-liberal thought was apparent here, as we have shown. In addition, it could be
argued that New Labour’s cultural policy was informed by a version of the long-
standing attempt to use art to form good citizens, but now inﬂected by neo-liberal
notions of the citizen-subject as ideally entrepreneurial, self-reliant and
self-creating.13
Neo-liberalism is only one way of understanding and evaluating New Labour –
a problematic but necessary concept. And Labour’s relationship to neo-liberalism
was complex. One response to perspectives that seek to complicate a reduction of
the New Labour project to neo-liberalism has been to refer to disjunctures between
neo-liberal theory and neo-liberal practice. Newsinger (2012, p. 115–116) asks,
rhetorically, whether increased public investment is evidence of a continued resis-
tance to neo-liberal values and practices. In implicitly answering this with a
resounding ‘no’, Newsinger draws on an argument he attributes to David Harvey’s
A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005), that ‘in practice neo-liberalism has not
been opposed to public subsidy per se’ (Newsinger 2012, p. 116). It is certainly
true that the practices of neo-liberalisation (as opposed to the theory of neo-liberal-
ism) extends far beyond questions of public expenditure, to include ﬁnancialisation,
the reconﬁguration of class power and the systematic privileging of the interests of
corporations. Governments with strong-stated commitments to neo-liberal theory
and competition adopt protectionist and anti-competitive practices, as Harvey
(2005, p. 71) and other commentators such as Freedman (2008, p. 41) note. Peck
(2010, p. 22) is surely right to say that insofar as neo-liberalism persists, it does so
through ‘mongrelisation’. All the same, it is a pretty strange deﬁnition of neo-
liberalism that fails to differentiate between governments that greatly increase
public expenditure on arts and culture, and those that seek to reduce it. After all,
conservative neo-liberals opposed increased public expenditure on arts and culture
under the Labour government. And, while no government would have maintained
public expenditure at pre-2008 levels following the global ﬁnancial crisis, the mas-
sive cuts to arts and culture funding, the BBC and local government funding
(which as we have seen is a vital resource for arts and cultural funding) that took
place under the post-2010 Coalition government suggest that, at the very least, the
UK is currently experiencing a rather different version of neo-liberalism than was
apparent under New Labour. And in any case, arguments over public funding from
general taxation versus corporate sponsorship ultimately do matter – perhaps more
than disputes over the meaning of words and phrases such as ‘neo-liberal’.
Neo-liberalism draws attention, via very broad brush strokes, to the general pub-
lic policy environment in which Labour was operating, one in which public invest-
ment needed to be defended more than ever against attack, and where it also
needed to be shown to be effective on economic grounds. But the term fails to pro-
vide adequate analytical grasp of other distinct ways in which cultural policy was
changing. McGuigan was surely right, in his work on neo-liberalism and cultural
policy, to invite exploration of the consequences of cultural policies that were
profoundly shaped by economistic conceptions of the good. But neo-liberalism can
only be part of any adequate sociological explanation and evaluation of Labour’s
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cultural policies. It was the coming together of neo-liberal, conservative and
economistic conceptions of policy with the crisis of aesthetic value associated with
‘postmodernism’ which shaped UK cultural policy under New Labour.
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Notes
1. ‘New Labour’ was the term that party leaders and managers used to rebrand the
Labour Party in the 1990s, in an attempt to differentiate the party from its socialist
past, in order to win votes from the ‘centre ground’ of UK politics. It was derived from
the use of the term ‘New Democrats’ in the USA, and in particular was inspired by the
electoral success of Bill Clinton in 1992, which ended 12 years of Republican
presidencies. We adopt the term ‘New Labour’ here to refer to the governments of the
1997–2010 period and also to its period in opposition under Blair’s leadership, from
1994 onwards.
2. ‘Cultural Policy Under New Labour’, funded by the UK Arts and Humanities Research
Council, 2012–2013.
3. In a speech as Prime Minister in 2007, Blair used the term ‘golden age’ to describe the
‘renaissance of British culture’ during his tenure. This was a transformation that he
believed would not have taken place without the support of the Labour government
(theguardian.com 2007).
4. Variations of McGuigan’s 2005 argument appear in two of his books (2004, 2010). In
the former, McGuigan valuably traces the rise of a new discourse of marketization in
British cultural policy in the 1980s.
5. Arts Council expenditure also signiﬁcantly increased between 1980 and 1994 – by
some 49% (Gray 2000, p. 109). However, as Gray notes, much of this increase
occurred as a result of the abolition of the Greater London Council and the six metro-
politan councils (Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire etc) in 1986, and the removal of
their arts budgets into Arts Council funding – to be distributed via the then Regional
Arts Boards. There can be little doubt that Labour showed considerably more
commitment to funding the arts from general taxation than their Conservative
predecessors – but see the following comments on the Lottery.
6. In academic research, public service broadcasting is usually considered separately from
cultural policy as part of media policy. This has been questioned (e.g., Hesmondhalgh
2005) but the convention seems resilient.
7. A report by the Local Government Association (England) in 2012 claimed that local
councils contributed £800 million to the arts and culture in England – as much as Arts
Council England – and that they co-fund 60% of the organisations funded by ACE.
8. The refurbishment of Millbank Power Station as Tate Modern was funded by the
national regeneration agency, English Partnerships, and was initiated under the Conser-
vative administration that preceded New Labour. It opened in 2000, and Labour got
much of the credit – just as they got the blame for the Millennium Dome project they
inherited.
9. Moss (2000) attributes these inﬂated projections to the ‘huge moral and political
pressures’ on policy makers and supposedly objective ‘consultants’ to support large
regional visitor attractions, especially comparisons with other attractions which were
not really comparable.
10. The ‘creative industries’ idea has been a widely discussed aspect of Labour policy,
including contributions by authors of this article, and so in the interests of space we
will not discuss it in detail here (nor have we space to discuss ﬁlm policy). While stra-
tegically useful in prising open greater public funding, Labour’s ‘creative industries’
policies arguably favoured corporate interests. This could be seen, for example, in
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Labour’s tendency to favour longer and stronger copyright terms and in their lack of
attention to problematic working conditions in the growing creative industries, in spite
of the party’s roots in the trade union movement. On Labour’s creative industries
policy and associated ideas, see Garnham 2005, Oakley 2006, Schlesinger 2009,
Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011, O’Connor 2010, Hesmondhalgh 2013, Hesmondhalgh
et al. in press.
11. Although it is a fallacy to say that Labour were unreasonably proﬂigate in their spend-
ing, it is true that they failed to spot the property and ﬁnancial services bubbles, and
to take ameliorative measures, as senior Labour politicians have since acknowledged.
12. Though Holden resorted to the then fashionable but later somewhat discredited concept
of public value to articulate policy pragmatics. See Lee et al. (2011) for discussion of
the concept of public value.
13. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing this point to our attention.
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